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Palmeri and Barnett: The Continuing Vitality of the Economic Loss Rule

The Continuing Vitality of the
Economic Loss Rule
John M. Palmeri & Monty L. Barnett*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, tort recovery for purely economic loss unaccompanied
by physical property damage has been barred by judicial application of
the economic loss rule. The rule finds its roots in the English common
law which generally defined legal duties in terms of contractual relationships. With the gradual expansion of tort law, the rule was developed in
an effort to clearly define the outer limits of tort liability. Preservation of
the physical harm requirement serves as a convenient touchstone for a
manageable limit on liability. This article examines the history of the economic loss rule, both nationally and within the state of Wyoming. It
explores the application of the rule and the exceptions which have developed to it. Although tort law has dramatically expanded from its English
common law roots, the viability of the economic loss rule continues.
Wyoming courts should avoid the quagmire of ad hoc exceptions and
continue to apply a "bright line" rule.
II.

HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

The economic loss rule marks the fundamental boundary between the
law of contracts, which is designed to enforce expectancy interests created
through an agreement between private parties, and the law of tort, which
seeks to protect citizens and their property by imposing a duty to use
reasonable care to avoid physical harm to others.' Although there is some
overlap, tort and contract are two distinct theories of recovery. Dean
William Prosser summarized this distinction as follows:
* John M. Palmeri is a shareholder of White and Steele P.C. Mr. Palmed received his B.A.
degree from Columbia University and his J.D. degree from the University of Denver, where he was a
member of the law review. He is also a member of the Federation of Insurance and Corporate Counsel,
licensed to practice in Colorado and Wyoming; Mr. Palmer handles complex civil litigation.
Monty L. Barnett obtained his J.D. from the University of Wyoming College of Law in
1992. Following law school, he accepted an associate position with White and Steele P.C. in Denver,
Colorado, with a focus on defense of personal injury, professional liability and products liability
actions. Mr. Barnett is licensed to practice law in Wyoming and Colorado.
1. Sidney R. Barrett. Jr., The Center Holds: The Continuing Role of the economic loss rule in
Construction Litigation, CONsTRUCTION LAW., April 1991, at 3. See Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp.,
678 F.2d 942, 949 (11th Cir. 1982).
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The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the
nature of the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which gave rise to them are imposed by the law,
and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily
upon the will or intention of the parties .

.

. Contract actions are

created to protect the interest in having promises performed.
Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties
manifesting consent, and are owed only to the specific individuals
named in the contract.2
The economic loss rule precludes recovery in tort where a person
suffers only economic loss. The rule is based upon the concept that,
absent privity of contract, no cause of action lies against a defendant
whose negligence prevents a plaintiff from obtaining a prospective pecuniary advantage. 3 The rule was largely adopted in section 766C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section provides that an actor is not
liable for purely pecuniary harm caused by the actor's negligent interference with a third-party's performance of his contract "with [the plaintiff],
or. . . with [plaintiff's] performance of his contract or making the performance more expensive or burdensome." 4
This rule has evolved throughout the past century, barring recovery
for economic loss when unaccompanied by physical harm. Although
receiving wide acceptance, the rule has been expressed in different ways
and its result explained on various grounds. For example, some courts
have simply ruled that the defendant owed no duty to plaintiff seeking
compensation for purely economic losses.' Other courts have reached the
same result by applying the doctrine of proximate cause.6 Several courts
have viewed the general rule against recovery as necessary to limit damages to reasonably foreseeable consequences of negligent conduct.' This

2. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Cosmopolitan
Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983) (Rovira, J., dissenting).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1977).
5. See, e.g., Mandal v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 527 P.2d 387 (Or. 1974) ( denying contractor
for a city recovery of economic losses resulting from another contractor's negligent performance of its
contract with the city).
6. See, e.g., Rickhards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945) (denying merchant on island
recovery for lost profits caused by negligent destruction of only bridge connecting mainland with
island).
7. For example, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), the court denied

a lender's claim that the defendant's accountants had negligently audited financial statements on which
the lender had relied. In dismissing the claim, Justice Cardozo stated, "If liability for negligence
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder... may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
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concern is often manifested as an issue of causation and has lead to the
requirement of physical harm which serves as a convenient touchstone to
limit recovery. The physical harm requirement functions as part of the
definition of the causal relationship between the defendant's negligent act
and the plaintiff's economic damages, thereby acting as a convenient limit
on otherwise boundless liability.' Pursuant to this view, the physical
consequences of negligence are limited but indirect economic injury is
unbounded. The Court of Appeals of Ohio elaborated upon the possibilities of indefinite liability in a case where the negligence of a gas company
caused an immense fire which interrupted business activities of various
companies in the vicinity, stating:
If, one, who by his negligence is legally responsible.

. .

not only

to those who have sustained personal injuries or physical property
damage but also to everyone who has suffered an economic
loss .

. .

. [Tihe door would be open to claims for damages based

on delay by all those who may have had contracts with [plaintiff's
employer] either to deliver materials to the company or to receive
from the company the products manufactured by it. Cases might
well occur where a manufacturer would be obligated to close
down his factory because of the inability of his supplier due to a
fire loss to make prompt deliveries; the power company with a
contract to supply a factory with electricity would be deprived of
the profit which it would have made if the operation of the factory had not been interrupted by reason of fire damage; a man who
had a contract to paint a building may not be able to proceed with
his work; a salesman who would have sold the products out of the
factory may be deprived of his commissions; the neighborhood
restaurant which relies on the trade of the factory employees may
suffer a substantial loss. 9

amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Id. at 444. See also Aikens v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1985). Employees of a plant damaged by a train derailment
sued the railroad for lost wages. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because the railroad had no knowledge of the contracts between the plant and its employees and thus had no way to
foresee harm to the plaintiffs interests. Permitting the claim "would create an undue burden upon the
industrial freedom of action," posing "a danger to our economic system." Id. at 279.
8. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). The United States Court of
Appeals recognized the strength of the rule, stating "that a contrary rule, which would allow compensation for all losses of economic advantages caused by defendant's negligence, would subject the
defendant to claims based upon remote and speculative injuries which he could not foresee in any
practical sense of the term." Id. at 563; see also Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903) (holding a
plaintiff who owned a printing plant could not recover lost profits when defendant negligently damaged utilities electrical conduits which supplied power to the plant).
9. Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
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The immediate policy reasons behind the rule are readily apparent.
Given the vestigial control devices in the early law of negligence, the
courts feared that once a duty to avoid economic loss was recognized
outside a contractual relationship, there would be no logical end to this
kind of liability."0 "The old bogey of 'the opening of the flood gates of
litigation' raised its head

. . .

in many early negligence cases,"" spawn-

ing a2 judicial reluctance to intertwine the law of contracts and the law of

tort. '

The rule has been applied in a wide variety of factual circumstances.
A common scenario is negligent injury to the person or property of one
party which in turn causes economic loss to another party, usually the
plaintiff in a tort action. For example, courts have denied recovery where
personal injury to a victim results in economic loss to the victim's employer through loss of the victim's services, 3 or to one who had a con-

10.

See General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111, 113 (D. Md. 1978). Plaintiff

sought to recover economic damages from defendants Penn Central Transportation Co. and the United
States for its injuries arising out of the closing of a bridge over a canal which interrupted plaintiff's
business activities. Id. In denying defendants' motion to dismiss, the court applied the economic loss
nule, stating:
Courts which have addressed this issue have repeatedly expressed concern that a contrary
rle would open the door to virtually limitless suits, often of a highly speculative and
remote nature. Such suits would expose the negligent defendant to a severe penalty, and
would produce serious problems in litigation, particularly in the areas of proof and apportionment of damages.
Id. at 113.
11. See Christopher Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence, 50 CAN. BAR REV. 580, 582
(1972).
12. The United States Supreme Court, in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
476 U.S. 858 (1986), upheld the economic loss rule. In that case, the manufacturer of ship turbines
failed to properly install certain components, resulting in the destruction of the turbines. The owner of
the ship sued the manufacturer in negligence and strict liability to recover the cost of repair and lost
profits from loss of use of the ship. The Court based its decision not on the nature of the damages
incurred, but on the source of the duty to avoid harm. The opinion acknowledged the "need to keep
[tort law] and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages." Id.
at 871. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the economic loss rule, applying South
Carolina law. 2000 Watermark Assocs., Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986).
There, the court held that a condominium association could not recover the cost of repairing a defective roof in an action for negligence. The court found that this was properly a contract claim,
stating that 'historically the only tort action available to the disappointed purchaser suffering an intangible economic loss was an action for fraud." Id. at 1185.
13. See, e.g., Baughman Surgical Assocs,, Ltd. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 302 So. 2d 316
(La. Ct. App. 1974) (holding defendant insurer not liable to plaintiff professional medical corporation
for loss of working time when one of its employees was injured as a result of the accident with the
insured); Ferguson v. Green Island Contracting Corp., 328 N.E.2d 792, (N.Y. 1975) (denying employer recovery of economic loss sustained as a result of negligent injury to employee responsible for
product design and development who was very difficult to replace); and Snow v. West, 440 P.2d 864
(Or. 1968) (holding employer had no cause of action for lost profits due to loss of employees' services resulting from defendant's alleged negligence in causing their deaths).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss2/22

4

Palmeri and Barnett: The Continuing Vitality of the Economic Loss Rule
1996

ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

tractual obligation to provide medical care to the victim,"n or to an insurance company that insured the victim's life or health."5 In other cases,
courts have denied recovery where the destruction of property belonging
to a party resulted in some economic injury to the plaintiff.' 6 In several
cases, courts have denied recovery for losses sustained by plaintiffs as a
result of the defendant's negligent destruction of a bridge which caused
economic losses to plaintiffs.1" In another, plaintiffs who lost their jobs
after the defendant negligently destroyed the factory where they worked
could not recover their loss of employment.'" Likewise, courts have denied recovery in numerous cases where the defendant negligently cut a
utility company's power cable or gas line thereby depriving plaintiff of
gas or electricity. 9
Judicial discomfort with the rule's general restriction of liability for
the economic consequences of negligence has lead to numerous exceptions. Two generalizations underlie the numerous exceptions. First, the
common rationale for allowing recovery of purely economic losses is
foreseeability. 2 Second, the degree to which a defendant knew or should
14. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1960) (denying recovery to a non-profit
organization retirement home which was obligated under a lifecare contract to provide medical care to
party negligently injured by defendant).
15. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H. Railroad, 25 Conn. 265 (1856)
(insurance company paid on life insurance policy; holding payment from tortfeasor in absence of
subrogation not recoverable when insurance company paid on life insurance policy); and Peoria Marine and Fire Ins. Co. v. Frost, 37 Ill. 333 (1865) (fire insurance policy).
16. See cases cited supra note 12. See also cases cited infra note 17.
17. Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945) (holding defendant not liable to plaintiffs who sought recovery of "losses from expectant gains" when defendant's barge negligently
crashed into and damaged a draw bridge which served as the only means of access to the island on
which plaintiffs' business premises were situated); In Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821
(2nd Cir. 1968) (holding defendant whose negligence caused the closing of a bridge over the Buffalo
River was not liable to plaintiffs who were engaged in the business of shipping grain on the river and
who sought recovery of expenses incurred as a result of the interruption of their business); and In re
Marine Navigation Sulphur Carriers, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Va. 1980), affirmed 638 F.2d 700
(4th Cir. 198 1) (dismissing plaintiffs claims for damages which included interference with contractual
obligations, loss of business expectancies, and increased business expenses, against defendant who
negligently caused the closing of a bridge).
18. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Stevenson
v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). To the extent that Adams holds that
there can be no recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, it was later
disapproved by the California Supreme Court in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
19. See, e.g., Cargill. Inc. v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1980); Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972); and Byrd v.
English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903).
20. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969) (decedent's daughters not barred from
maintaining action against attorney who negligently failed to fulfill testamentary directions) overruled on
other grounds, Laird v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691 (Cal. 1992); Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P.
1966) (holding legatees could sue attorney for negligent drafting of will); Rozny v. Mamul, 250 N.E.2d
656, 663 (Il. 1969) (holding surveyor liable to remote purchasers for negligently measuring boundary lines);
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have known the extent of the consequences of the negligent conduct,
including economic loss, plays a dispositive role in a court's holding;
more knowledge means more culpability. 2
One of the most common circumstances in which courts permit
recovery of economic loss is where there is also some physical injury.'
In that regard, a common tenet of the general rule is that there can be no
recovery for economic loss in the absence of some physical injury.'
Another well-established exception to the rule arises in cases involving
private actions for public nuisances. For example, in some cases plaintiffs
were able to recover from a defendant who had negligently interfered
with or destroyed the plaintiffs' exercise of a public right of access to a
public or common resource when the plaintiffs' business was based, in
part, on this right.' These cases have allowed recovery based on the
theory that the defendant could foresee the pecuniary losses that those
who made direct use of the resource would suffer because the losses were
so closely linked, through defendant's behavior, to the resource.'
Courts have also recognized exceptions where there is some special
relationship between the tortfeasor and the individual or business deprived
of economic expectations. Such relationship is commonly found where the
defendant stands in a fiduciary or professional relationship to the plaintiff.
For example, a trustee may be liable if, in fulfilling his fiduciary obligations, he negligently injures the economic interests of a beneficiary.' The
H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983) (holding independent auditor who negligently
made inaccurate public statement liable to stockholder subsequently holding worthless stock); and A.E. Inv.
Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974) (allowing tenant to maintain action to recover
from architect and builder for defective design and construction of building that resulted in economic loss to
tenant even though parties not in privity).
21. See cases cited supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); Newlin v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1944);
Duchene v. Wolstan, 258 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 1977); Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. F.M.C.
Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Guido v. Hudson Transit Lines, 178 F.2d 740 (3d
Cir. 1950) (allowing plaintiff to recover expected profit from a two-year lease of its truck, which was
destroyed by defendant).
23. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MAV Test Bank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.
1985); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., Inc., 583 P.2d 997 (Idaho 1978).
24. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Test Bank, 752 F2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (holding defendants, responsible for ship collision that polluted Mississippi River, liable for
economic loss to all commercial fisherman, shrimpers, crabbers, and oystermen); Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (commercial fishermen who used commercial waters allowed to
recover from defendant who negligently caused oil spill); Masonite Corp. v. Steede, 23 So. 2d 756
(Miss. 1945) (granting operator of fishing resort recovery for profits lost due to pollution); Hampton
v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1943) (holding polluter liable for downstream
landowner's economic losses).
25. See cases cited supra note 20.
26. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 201 (1979).
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special relationship exception has been extended to auditors,' surveyors,2
termite inspectors,29 engineers,30 and attorneys.31 Common among those
cases which have expanded the special relationship exception is the fact
that the plaintiffs belong to a particularly foreseeable group. The special
relationship exception appears to be an expression of the court's satisfaction that a duty of care existed because the plaintiffs were particularly
foreseeable and the injury was proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Courts have also imposed liability for negligent injury to economic
interests where there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and the
initial victim of the defendant's negligence, as opposed to those examples
provided above where there is a special relationship directly between the
plaintiff and the defendant. This most often occurs in cases involving a
family relationship.32 Spouses have recovered damages for loss of consortium resulting from an injury to the other spouse, and parents have recovered for the loss of services resulting from injury to a child.33 In some
cases, family members of the victim have also recovered costs incurred in
caring for the victim.'
Another instance in which a claim for economic loss has been recognized involves the situation where the economic loss flowed from or was
"parasitic" to physical damage to the person or property. As stated by the
Ninth Circuit:
The right to recover for economic losses which are parasitic to an
injury occurring to person or property is not questioned...

27. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983) (holding independent auditor
whose negligence resulted in inaccurate public financial statement liable to plaintiff who bought stock
in company for purposes of sale of business to company when stock subsequently proved to be worthless).
1969) (holding surveyor whose negligence re28. See Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656 (11.
suited in error in depicting boundary of lot held liable to remote purchaser).
29.

See Hardy v. Carmichael, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (holding termite inspec-

tors whose negligence resulted in purchase of infested home liable to out-of-privity buyers).
30. See M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961) (holding engineers whose negligence resulted in successful bidder's losses in performing con-

struction contract liable).
31.

See Lucas v. Harm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962)

(holding attorney whose negligence caused intended beneficiary to be deprived of proceeds of the will
liable to beneficiary).

32. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (5th ed. 1984).
33.

See id. See also In re Knowles v. United States, 554 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996) and United

States v. Dempsey, 635 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1994).
34. See, e.g., Follansbe v. Benzenberg, 265 P.2d 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954); Thompson v.

1952); and Hansen v. Hayes, 154 P.2d 202 (Or. 1944).
City of Bushnell, 105 N.E.2d 311 (Ill.
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Furthermore, this is the case even though frequently the magnitude of the economic loss so far overshadows that of the physical
injury as to warrant the assertion that the general rule, barring
recovery absent a physical injury, is but a formalism.35
Thus, where the injury was initially to the person or the property of
the person with whom plaintiff was engaged in economic relations and
plaintiff's economic expectancy was damaged by reason of such injury,
recovery has been allowed.
Likewise, in Akr'eselskabet Cuzco v. Sucarseco,a6 plaintiff cargo
owners recovered sums which they had been obliged to pay under a contribution clause after the carrying ship was damaged through defendant's
negligence. There, both vessels were at fault and both were damaged.
Although the cargo was physically damaged by the collision, this fact
appears to have had no bearing on the Court's resolution of the issue.
Rather, the Court recognized that the right of cargo owners to have their
general average contribution restored sprang directly from the tort and
was in no sense derivative or parasitically dependent upon the presence of
a physical injury.37
Finally, some courts have permitted recovery of economic losses
under alternative theories where plaintiff would have otherwise had no
direct action against defendant based upon a negligence theory. The doctrine of subrogation has been used to recover economic loss where such
recovery would be otherwise unavailable in a direct negligence action.3" A
defendant who negligently destroys property is normally liable in negligence only to the owner of the property.39 Nevertheless, the company

35.

Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 1974).

36. 294 U.S. 394 (1935).

37. Id. at 399.
38. Subrogation is defined as:
The substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he who has substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation
to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies or securities. Subrogation denotes the exchange of a third person who has paid a debt in the place of the creditor to whom he has
paid it, so that he may exercise against the debtor all the rights, which the creditor, if
unpaid, might have done.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990); See also United States v. Munsey Trust Co. of
Wash. D.C., 332 U.S. 234, 242 (1947).

39. Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877) states:
The relation between the insurance company and MeLemore, the deceased, was created by contact between them, to which Brame [the person who killed the deceased] was not a party. The
injury inflicted by him (Brame] was upon McLernore, against his personal rights; that it hap-

pened to injure the plaintiff (Insurance Company] was an incidental circumstance, a remote and
indirect result, not necessarily or legitimately resulting from the act of killing.
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which insures the property owner may be subrogated to the insured's
claim against the defendant and is therefore allowed to recover from
defendant the amount paid under the policy of insurance. 4°
In other circumstances, plaintiffs are allowed to bring an action
directly against a defendant for breach of contract, although plaintiff has
suffered only economic losses. A case in point involved a defendant who
entered into a contract with a city for the renovation of a downtown
business area. 4' The contract required the defendant to take certain precautions to limit the disruption to the businesses within the area to be
renovated. Plaintiff, the operator of a retail business located within the
renovation area, brought an action against the defendant claiming that its
business had been damaged by the defendant's negligent failure to take
precautions required in the contract. Applying the economic loss rule, the
court specifically held that the plaintiff could not recover in negligence
because the damages were purely economic.42 However, the court found
that plaintiff could bring an action directly against the defendant for
breach of contract under a third party beneficiary theory.4
One may draw several conclusions after examining the decisions of
the courts that have construed these exceptions. One differentiating factor
between those cases allowing recovery and those denying recovery is
foreseeability; that is, recovery hinges on whether a defendant could
foresee that the negligent conduct would cause harm to a specific person,
known class of persons, or foreseeable persons under the circumstances. '
What a reasonably prudent person would do under the circumstances of a
particular case comprises the most general test of negligence. Specifically,
courts discussing the concept of duty have stated that it should encompass
one's knowledge of the circumstances and the risk of harm one's actions
created in these circumstances, including one's reasonable apprehension
of risk.45

Id. at 758. See also Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N. H. Railway, 25 Conn. 265
(1856) (holding insurance company has no direct right of action against negligent tortfeasor who
injures the insured because its damages were too remote and indirect); and Peoria Marine & Fire Ins.
Co. v. Frost, 37 I11.33 (1865) (holding insurance company cannot maintain an action in its own name
against tortfeasor who has damaged insured property in order to recovery for what it has paid the
insurer).
40. Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., Inc., 583 P.2d 997 (Idaho 1978).

41. Id.
42. Id. at 1005-06.
43. Id. at 1002.
44. See cases cited supra note 20. The issue of foreseeability is important both to the question
of the duty that a defendant owed and the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries. Kelly M. Hnatt,
Purely Economic Loss: A Standardfor Recovery, 73 IOWA L.R. 1181 (1988).

45. See cases cited supra note 20.
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Although recovery of economic loss has generally been limited to
circumstances in which the potential for open-ended liability can be avoided, a few recent cases suggest a more relaxed judicial attitude towards the
problem of indefinite liability, or at least a greater willingness to deal
with it on a case-by-case basis. For the most part, however, such liability
has been extended only to third parties whose losses were not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen. In two relatively recent cases, H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler' and Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt &
Co. ,' the New Jersey and Wisconsin Supreme Courts respectively refused
to restrict liability to specifically foreseen plaintiffs, holding instead that
liability should extend to virtually all foreseeable plaintiffs. The Wisconsin court stated specifically that liability of accountants for economic loss
suffered by third parties should be governed by the general principles of
Wisconsin negligence law according to which a tortfeasor is fully liable
for all foreseeable consequences of his negligence, unless under the facts
of a particular case liability is denied on grounds of public policy."
Among the factors mentioned by the court to be considered on a case-bycase basis as matters of public policy were whether the injury was wholly
out of proportion to the culpability of the defendant; whether allowance of
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the defendant; and
whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or
just stopping point.49 Thus, the problems associated with indeterminate
liability are still considered, but on a case-by-case basis.
In an opinion of potentially broader applicability, the California
Supreme Court indicated its willingness to deal with problems of indefinite liability on a case-by-case basis. In J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,s' the
defendant negligently failed to complete a construction project in a timely
manner thereby forcing the plaintiff, a lessee who operated a restaurant in
the premises involved, to remain closed for a long period of time. The
trial court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's claim for lost profits, but the
California Supreme Court reversed and held that there was no absolute
bar to recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage.' The court acknowledged the problems associated with inde46. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
47. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
48. Id. at 366.
49. Id.
50. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
51. Id. at 65-66. The court said:
These factors [enumerated in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958)] and ordinary
principles of tort law such as proximate cause fully adequate to limit recovery without the
drastic consequences of an absolute rule which bars recovery in all cases [where economic
interests are harmed]. (Citation omitted). Following these principles, recovery for negligent
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terminate liability but concluded that a case-by-case consideration of
factors such as the foreseeability of the injury and the nexus between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury, together with ordinary
principles of tort law, are fully adequate to limit liability without resort to
an absolute rule. 2
Several maritime decisions also point in the same direction. In In re
Kinsman Transit Co. ,53 the court, in denying recovery for damages resulting from a blockage of the Buffalo River, rejected any absolute rule
prohibiting recovery for negligent interference with contract.' Instead,
the court chose to apply normal tort principles and conclude that, on the
facts of that case, the connection between defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's damages was too tenuous to permit recovery."
In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,56 the plaintiffs, commercial fishermen,
suffered losses as a result of an oil spill which diminished the quantity of
aquatic life in the Santa Barbara Channel. The court acknowledged the
general rule that negligent interference with prospective economic advantage is not actionable but nevertheless refused defendants' request for
partial summary judgment.5 7 In effect, the court held that the defendants'
alleged negligent conduct was actionable because plaintiffs' alleged injury
was a foreseeable consequence of that conduct, thus applying general
principles of negligence law even though plaintiffs' injuries were purely
economic."8 On the other hand, the court noted that plaintiffs, as commercial fishermen, made direct use of the sea in the ordinary course of their
business, and carefully stated that it did not mean to open the door to
claims by other parties who might have suffered economic losses as a

interference with prospective economic advantage will be limited to instances where the
risk of harm is foreseeable and is closely connected with the defendant's conduct, where
damages are not wholly speculative and the injury is not part of the plaintiff's ordinary
business risk.
J'aire, 598 P.2d at 65-66.
52. J'Aire Corp., 598 P.2d at 64.
53.

388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).

54. Id. at 823
55. Id. at 824.
56. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 570.
58. Id. at 569.
[W]e cannot escape the conclusion that under California law the presence of a duty on the
part of the defendants in this case would turn substantially on foreseeability. That being the
crucial determinate, the question must be asked whether the defendants could reasonably
have foreseen the negligently-conducted drilling operations might diminish aquatic life and
thus injure the business of commercial fishermen. We believe the answer is yes.
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result of the oil spill.59 Thus, although the court spoke in terms of foreseeability, the opinion strongly suggests that the court would restrict
liability short of the limits of foreseeability, perhaps to those who make
direct use of the sea.
Another case involving familiar facts forced the court to confront the
problem of indefinite liability more directly. In Pruitt v. Allied Chemical
Corp.,60 the defendants were allegedly responsible for chemical pollution
of the James River and the Chesapeake Bay. Plaintiffs included commercial fishermen, seafood wholesalers, retailers, restaurateurs, marina operators, boat owners, tackle and bait shop owners, and others, all of whom
claimed the pollution in some way caused them economic loss. The defendant, relying on Union Oil, urged the court to limit its liability to those
who exploited the bay directly. The court observed, however, that no
sharp distinction existed between those who relied on the bay directly and
those who relied on the bay indirectly, rather that the different groups of
plaintiffs depended on the bay in varying degrees of immediacy. 6' Moreover, the court noted that, as one traced the stream of profits flowing
from the bay's seafood, the set of potential plaintiffs became almost infinite.62 Accordingly, the court acknowledged a need to impose some limit
on the defendant's potential liability, but confessed that it had no
articulable reason for excluding any particular group of plaintiffs. 3 Ultimately, the court held that the losses suffered by those who purchased
and marketed seafood from commercial fishermen were not actionable,
because they were too remote, but that the losses suffered by commercial
fishermen and by boat, tackle and bait shop, and marina owners were
actionable.' The court described its resolution of the case as "an attempt
to tailor justice to the facts of the instant case.'
Finally, in People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.,' the New Jersey Supreme Court fashioned a tort of negligent
infliction of economic loss. The court's decision represents a cogent
analysis of tort law and the economic loss rule. There, a fire began in the
freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) after
gas escaped from a tank car punctured during coupling operation. The
municipal authorities, in consultation with Conrail, evacuated the area

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 570.
523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D.Va. 1981).
Id. at 978-79.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.
495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
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within a one-mile radius of the fire to lessen the risk if the tank car exploded. The evacuation area included a terminal of the Newark International Airport housing People Express' business operations. Although the
feared explosion never occurred, People Express employees could not use
the terminal for twelve hours. The airline sued Conrail for negligence,
seeking to recover the amount of its fixed operating costs allocable to the
period of evacuation and lost profits. The trial court applied the economic
loss rule and granted summary judgment to Conrail.67 People Express
appealed.
The New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to strike a compromise by
fashioning a tort of negligent infliction of economic loss. The court reasoned that ordinary principles of foreseeability would create hopelessly
unpredictable claims.' A per se rule against recovery, however, would
frustrate the purposes of tort law to compensate wronged persons for their
injuries and to hold liable the responsible parties." The court attempted to
resolve the dilemma by holding that a defendant has a duty of due care to
avoid inflicting economic loss "to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom defendant knows or has
reason to know are likely to suffer damages from its conduct." 7' The
court's proximate cause and damage analysis ran together. A defendant
cannot proximately cause economic loss that is "only generally foreseeable," but may proximately cause economic loss that it is "in a position
particularly to foresee."' It is liable only for those damages it proximately causes, that is, those that "are reasonably to be anticipated in view of
defendant's capacity to have foreseen

. . .

the risk" to the plaintiff or

class of plaintiffs.' The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Conrail
could have foreseen People Express' economic loss in the event of a gas
leak because of the proximity of its offices to the freight yard, defendant's
knowledge of the volatility of the gas, the obvious impact of a shutdown
on the airline's operations, and the apparent existence of an emergency
response plan which called for the nearby area to be evacuated in the
event of a leak.'
The cases discussed above illustrate the difficulties that courts have
encountered when they recognize exceptions to the general rule of nonliability for purely economic loss. The law is replete with cases in which
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

109.
116.
111.
116.
117.
118.

73. Id.
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recovery is allowed without a well-reasoned or well-defined basis for the
decision. In the aftermath of these appellate decisions, trial courts and
trial counsel are left to deal with, essentially, ad-hoc exceptions to the
general rule. Across the country, the state of the law is, at best, a confusing mosaic of appellate decisions.
III. HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN WYOMING
The economic loss rule was first recognized by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Buckley v. Bell.74 There, plaintiff brought an action to
recover the cost of his hay baler which was destroyed by a fire caused by
the acts of defendant. Plaintiff had ordered some regular gasoline from
defendant for the baler but defendant's employee incorrectly filled the
baler with diesel fuel. Upon discovering the mistake, plaintiff drained the
diesel fuel from the baler's tank and filled the tank with regular gasoline.
The engine backfired and the gasoline was ignited. The hay baler was destroyed in the fire. Plaintiff filed seeking recovery for the cost of his hay
baler and additional costs incurred in harvesting his hay because his hay
baler was destroyed. Plaintiffs action was premised upon theories of
strict products liability, breach of warranties, and negligence. Because
plaintiff sustained injury to his property (the hay baler), the economic loss
rule was not applicable. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly
recognized that the tort theory of strict products liability is an inappropriate vehicle for recovery of a purely economic loss.' Approximately four
years later, the Wyoming Supreme Court again opined that in the absence
of injury to a plaintiff or her property, recovery of purely economic
losses is not available under a tort theory.76 In Champion Well Service,
Inc. v. AL Indus., the plaintiff/employer sued defendant claiming that
defendant negligently injured one of plaintiff's key employees and, as a
result, caused economic loss to plaintiff. It was undisputed that plaintiff
suffered no direct injury. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which was granted by the
trial court. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly recognized
that where the economic damages are not associated with any injury to
person or property, there is no cause of action for purely economic losses.' In so holding, the court stated that:

74.
75.
76.
77.

703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985).
Id. at 1095.
See Champion Well Serv., Inc. v. NL Indus., 769 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1989).
Id. at 384.
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[T]o hold that [defendant] owed a duty to diverse third persons,
including [plaintiff/employer], to avoid injury to [plaintiff's employee] would be to adopt a rule that is too broad, unwieldy, and
impractical in present day society .... We are convinced that
the cause of action argued by [plaintiff] would erase the bright
marked negligence claims for ecoline which "has traditionally
78
nomic harm as off limits."
In that same year, the Wyoming Supreme Court again held that the
economic loss rule is the law in Wyoming."9 Recognizing that the economic loss rule is based upon the principle that a claim for economic loss
on contract cannot be translated into a tort action, the court echoed the
reasoning employed by numerous courts throughout the past century
which have also applied the rule.
The recognized majority rule is that a claim for pure economic
loss .. does not lie on a theory of negligence or strict liability .... This rule is founded on solid policy justifications .... The

authorities recognize that the law of contracts is far better suited to
deal with the dissatisfaction on the part of [the contracting parties].s
If there were any confusion as to the application of the economic loss
rule in Wyoming, such confusion was put to rest in Richardson Assoc. v.
Lincoln-Devore, Inc.," and Schneider Natl, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co.2 In
Richardson Assocs., a faulty construction case, the court refused to apply tort
concepts to a cause of action premised upon contractual principles.' Similarly, in Schneider Nat 7,the court stated in clear and unequivocal language that
purely "economic damages .. are not recoverable under tort theories of
strict liability and warranty. "' Accordingly, the economic loss rule is the law
in Wyoming and establishes that a claim for economic loss on contract cannot
be translated into a tort action.
The economic loss rule cannot be cast aside simply by characterizing
defendant's conduct as negligent. This principle was recognized by Justice
Joseph Cardine in his statement that:
78. Id. at 385 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at

1001 (5th
79.
80.
(1986)).
81.
82.

ed. 1984)).
Continental Ins. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1989).
Id. at 647 (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858
806 P.2d 790 (Wyo. 1991).
843 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1992).

83. Richardson Assocs., 806 P.2d at 814.
84. Schneider National, Inc., 843 P.2d at 586.
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An action upon a contract does not become an action also in tort
simply by use of the word negligence in a pleading. If that were
so, every contract action would also be a tort action.8
This distinction has also been recognized by Justice Richard Thomas:
It is clear to me that, when the relationship of the parties to an
action is founded in a business context, and they have made contracts concerning their obligations to one another, those contractual responsibilities ought to be resolved as contractual matters. I
shall always perceive it a mistake to create a tort claim as an
overlay to a breach of contract. That has the effect only of confusing two very separate areas of the law.'
These two statements indicate that the Wyoming Supreme Court recognizes the important distinction between contract and tort actions.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has had the opportunity to address the
economic loss rule on a number of occasions over the last decade. The
Wyoming cases have arisen in a number of factual settings. To its credit,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has limited tort recovery for purely economic losses. The decisions have been well-reasoned and reflect appropriate recognition of the legitimate purpose of the rule, which is to establish
a well-defined limit on tort recovery. The continuing vitality of the economic loss rule in Wyoming requires that future decisions follow this precedent. The Wyoming Supreme Court should avoid the temptation to
create exceptions to the rule which will result in case-by-case decision
making, as is found in many states.
V.

CONCLUSION

At common law, the courts in England understood and accepted
contract principles. Courts in England disliked and limited tort principles.
The concerns in Old England ring true today. As Justice Cardine noted,
every contract action could conceivably be a tort action. The economic
loss rule maintains the important distinction between contract and tort
principles. It imposes well-defined, manageable limits upon tort actions.
Wyoming courts should avoid the temptation to create exceptions to the
rule, as many states have done. The economic loss rule should continue to
85. See First Wyo. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1064, 1093 (Wyo. 1993) (Cardine,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Id. at 1093-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting opinion).
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773

be applied in the state of Wyoming to maintain the delicate balance between the well-defined boundaries of contract claims and the amorphous
boundaries of tort claims.
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